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We propose and demonstrate a novel physical secure 
high-speed optical communication scheme based on 
synchronous chaotic spectral phase encryption (CSPE) 
and decryption (CSPD). The CSPE is performed by a 
module composed of two dispersion components and one 
phase modulator (PM) between them, and the CSPD is 
carried out by a twin module with reverse dispersions 
and inverse PM driving signals. The PM driving signals of 
the CSPE and CSPD modules are privately-synchronized 
chaotic signals that are independently generated by local 
external-cavity semiconductor lasers subject to common 
injection. The numerical results indicate that with the 
CSPE, the original message can be encrypted as a noise-
like signal, and the timing clock of original message is 
efficiently hidden in the encrypted signal. Based on the 
private synchronization of the chaotic PM driving signals, 
only the legal receiver can decrypt the message correctly, 
while the eavesdropper is not able to intercept useful 
message. Moreover, the proposed scheme can also 
support secure symmetric bidirectional high-speed WDM 
transmissions. This work shows a prospective way to 
implement high-speed secure optical communications at 
physical layer. © 2019 Optical Society of America 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1364/OL.99.099999 
In recent years, along with the unprecedented fast developments 
in communications and computer technologies, the information 
security risks grow considerably, which has attracted worldwide 
extensive attention [1]. While most of the previously published 
security enhancement strategies are based on algorithm 
encryption, such as the typical AES. Due to the deterministic 
characteristic of algorithms, this kind of encryption is facing a 
significantly serious threat since with sufficiently fast computation 
ability, such as the emerging quantum computation, the encrypted 
message may still be intercepted by an exhaustive attack. 
Therefore, it is greatly important and timely to explore advanced 
physical encryption with nondeterministic characteristics to 
further enhance the security of communication systems. 
To address the abovementioned challenges in the field of optical 
communications, several physical security strategies, such as 
quantum communications [2,3], chaos communications [4-7] and 
optical code division multiple access (OCDMA) have been reported 
[8,9]. However, due to the stringent device requirements and the 
limited rate of quantum key distribution, the quantum encryption 
is not suitable for the present high-speed optical communications 
[2]. Regarding the chaos communications that utilizes the intrinsic 
information hiding characteristic of chaos, due to the limited 
bandwidth of chaotic carrier, it can only support maximum 
transmission bit rates up to about 10 Gbit/s [10], and meanwhile, 
when the message bit rate is low, the encryption efficiency of chaos 
communications is relatively low, the message may be intercepted 
by the attack ways of direct detection linear filtering and utilization 
of synchronization [11,12]. OCDMA is another way of using 
physical effect for encryption, the security of communication is 
based on overlapping multiple channels in the same frequency 
space. Nevertheless, it would induce substantial measurement 
burden for the specific optical domain encoding and decoding, and 
its practical security is still an open question [13]. From a different 
perspective, in this paper we propose a high-speed physical secure 
optical communication scheme based on chaotic spectral phase 
encryption (CSPE), in which distributed privately-synchronous 
chaotic signals are used as the secret key to encrypt (decrypt) the 
message signal as (from) a noise-like signal. The proposed secure 
scheme supports secure high-speed bidirectional WDM 
transmission on the physical layer, and it is inherently transparent 
to the modulation formats and can be flexibly compatible with the 
existing optical communication systems. 
Figure 1 shows a configuration of the proposed secure optical 
communication scheme. At the transmitter (Alice) end, the 
message is firstly modulated into a continuous-wave (CW) optical 
carrier by a typical intensity modulator (IM). Any modulation 
formats, such as OOK, QPSK, QAM are applicable. After that, the 
optical message signal is sent into a CSPE module which is 
composed of two dispersion components (D1 and D2) and one 
phase modulator (PM) between them. D1 is used to intensively 
distort the message signal in the time domain, the PM is adopted to 
expand the spectrum in the optical domain, and D2 is used to 
convert the spectrum-expanded phase signal into intensity. D1 and 
D2 can be constructed with dispersion fiber or fiber grating, and 
the PM driving signal is a chaotic signal which is photon-detected 
from the output of a local chaotic external cavity semiconductor 
laser (ECSL) SLA that is subject to injection from a driving chaotic 
laser DSL. The configuration of the CSPE is similar to that of the 
fractional Fourier transformation (FRFT) in [14] and the spectral 
phase encoding for OCDMA system reported in [15]. However, the 
FRFT requires identical and negative dispersion coefficients for the 
dispersion components and positive sinusoidal PM driving signal 
[14], and the spectral phase encoding is performed with two 
dispersion components with opposite dispersion coefficients and a 
PM driven by orthogonal binary optical codes [15]. Nevertheless, 
in the proposed CSPE, the PM is driven by private chaotic signal, 
and the dispersions of D1 and D2 can be set independently and 
arbitrarily. With the joint effects of the dispersion and the chaotic 
phase modulation, the message signal is encrypted as a totally 
different signal in both of time domain and frequency domain, thus 
we refer this encryption as the CSPE. At the receiver (Bob) end, a 
twin chaotic spectral phase decryption (CSPD) module with two 
dispersion components having opposite signs (-D2 and -D1) and a 
PM driven by an inverse chaotic driving signal is adopted to 
decrypt the message. The PM driving signal for the CSPD is the 
output of a local ECSL SLB which is identical to SLA and subject to 
identical chaotic injection from DSL. The chaotic injection signal of 
SLB is transmitted along with the encrypted signal, in virtue of the 
WDM technique. Similar to the common-signal-induced chaos 
synchronization for secure key distribution reported in [16,17], 
with proper selections of the strength of chaotic injection from DSL 
and the feedback strengths of SLA and SLB, the chaotic outputs of 
SLA and SLB can be well synchronized but different from that of 
DSL, which guarantees the privacy of CSPE and CPSD, and hence 
provides high-level physical security for the message transmission. 
It is worth mentioning that the dispersion of transmission link can 
be regarded as one part of -D2, and thus no extra dispersion 
compensation for the transmission link is necessary. In addition, 
since the CPSE and CPSD modules can be plugged-in and pulled-
out freely, the proposed physical security technique can be flexibly 
compatible with existing optical communication systems. 
 Simulations are jointly performed on the VPIphotonics and the 
Matlab software. The intrinsic parameters of DSL, SLA and SLB are 
set as the representative values of typical SLs reported in [5,18], 
and their operation wavelengths are set as 1553.2 nm. The bias 
current, feedback strength and feedback delay of DSL are set as 29 
mA, 20 ns-1 and 3 ns, respectively, while those of SLA and SLB are 
chosen as 22 mA, 15 ns-1, and 2 ns, respectively. The injection 
strength from DSL to SLA and SLB are chosen as 50 ns-1. The CW 
laser is a DFB laser working at 1550 nm with a linewidth of 10 
MHz, an output power of 1mW, a side-mode suppression ratio of 
30 dB, and a relative intensity noise (RIN) level of -150 dB/Hz. The 
half-voltage of the PM is 4 V, and the peak amplitude of chaotic PM 
driving signal is 6 V. The transmission link is a 50 km single mode 
fiber with a dispersion coefficient of 16 ps/nm/km and a loss 
coefficient of 0.2 dB/km. A semiconductor optical amplifier with a 
centralized wavelength of 1550 nm, a 3-dB bandwidth of 30 nm, 
an optical gain of 10 dB and a noise figure of 7 dB, is adopted to 
compensate the transmission-induced attenuation at the receiver 
end. The noise figures of the photodetectors and the electronic 
amplifiers are set as 10-12 A/Hz-1/2. The dispersion components for 
the CSPE and the CSPD are constructed using dispersive fibers. 
Specifically, D1 is a dispersive fiber with a length of 2 km and a 
dispersion coefficient of 500 ps/nm/km, and D2 is a similar 
dispersive fiber with a length of 3 km. The dispersion coefficients 
of –D1 and –D2 are opposite to those of D1 and D2, and the length 
of -D1 is 2km, while the length of -D2 is 4.6 km (500 ps/nm/km × 3 
km + 16 ps/nm/km × 50 km = 500 ps/nm/km × 4.6 km), which 
takes the compensation for the transmission link dispersion into 
consideration. In addition, for the sake of simplicity, the 
modulation format of message is set as OOK. 
Figure 2 illustrates the process of CSPE for the transmission 
cases with typical bit rates of 10 Gbit/s and 40 Gbit/s. Apparently, 
in the time domain, the original regular OOK messages shown in 
Figs. 2 (a1) and (b1) are converted into totally different noise-like 
signals, which means the original messages are efficiently hidden 
in the encrypted signal. Simultaneously, in the frequency domain, 
the RF spectra of encrypted signals are much flatter and wider 
than those of original signals. Moreover, the intrinsic timing clocks 
(the peaks at the positions of bit rate and its harmonic frequencies 
in Figs. 2(a2) and 2(b2)) in the original messages are efficiently 
hidden in the flat-spectrum encrypted message, which also greatly 
 
Fig. 1.  Schematic of the proposed secure optical communication 
system based on the private CSPE/D. SL, semiconductor laser; DSL, 
driving SL; IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase modulator; Amp, RF 
amplifier; (I)PD: (inverse) photodetector; OI, optical isolator; D, 
dispersion component; FC, fiber coupler; R, reflector; m(t), original 
message; m’(t), recovery message. 
 
Fig. 2.  Temporal waveforms and RF spectra of the OOK message 
signal before (black) and after (blue) the CSPE for the cases of 10 
Gbit/s (first column) and 40Gbit/s (second column) transmissions. 
increases the difficulty of interception, because without the timing 
clock of original message, the eavesdropper cannot process the 
intercepted signal with precise sampling, let alone recover correct 
message. Therefore, with the proposed CSPE, the message can be 
well hidden in the encrypted signal, it is extremely difficult for the 
eavesdropper to intercept the message by directly analyzing the 
noise-like encrypted signal. 
The chaos synchronization between SLA and SLB is the key to 
decrypt the message from the noise-like transmission signal. 
Figure 3 presents the temporal waveforms of the chaotic signals 
outputted by DSL, SLA and SLB, as well as the cross-correlation 
functions between them. It is indicated that the chaotic outputs of 
SLA and SLB are well synchronized with a correlation coefficient 
(CC) of 0.99, while the cross-correlation between them and the 
injection chaos from DSL is relatively low (CC=0.57). The high-
quality chaos synchronization between SLA and SLB guarantees 
the successful decryption of message, and simultaneously the low 
cross-correlation between DSL and SLA (SLB) guarantees the 
privacy of the chaotic PM driving signals. Since the chaotic PM 
driving signals are independently generated by the local lasers SLA 
and SLB, and only the chaos injection from DSL is transmitted over 
the public link, the eavesdropper cannot obtain precise chaotic PM 
driving signals from the injection, as such he cannot intercept the 
message, which will be confirmed in the following discussions.  
Next, we turn to investigate the message transmission between 
Alice and Bob, on the basis of the private CSPE and CSPD. Figures 
4(a1) and 4(b1) show the decrypted messages with synchronous 
CSPD, for the 10Gbit/s and 40Gbit/s transmission cases. Obviously, 
with the synchronous CSPD, the original messages shown in Figs. 
2(a1) and 2(b1) are correctly recovered. Moreover, to visually 
demonstrate the system security against illegal interceptions, here 
we consider three indicative attack scenarios, which are described 
as follows. Attack I: the eavesdropper intercepts the message by 
directly detecting the public link signal (encrypted signal). Attack II: 
the eavesdropper uses the chaos injection from DSL as the PM 
driving signal of CSPD, to intercept the message. Attack III: the 
eavesdropper injects the chaotic signal from DSL into a solitary 
laser (no feedback) with intrinsic parameters that are identical to 
those of SLA and SLB, to generate a local chaotic PM driving signal 
for the CSPD to intercept the message. Here it is assumed that the 
eavesdropper knows the message bit rate, although it has been 
confirmed that the timing clock can be totally hidden by the CSPE 
[Figs. 2(a4) and 2(b4)]. Apparently, with respect to the original and 
legally-decrypted messages, the intercepted messages under these 
attack scenarios are chaotic, no useful message is recovered. That 
is, the proposed physical secure optical communication system can 
defend these attacks.  
To systematically study the communication performance and 
security of the proposed scheme, we present the Q-factor of the 
messages recovered by the legal CSPD and the abovementioned 
attacks, versus the bit rate of message in Fig. 5. The definition of Q-
factor is identical to those in [5,17]. Under the legal CSPD scenario, 
although the Q-factor of the recovery message gradually decreases 
with increasing bit rate of message, an acceptable communication 
performance with a Q-factor around 6 can be maintained for the 
high-speed transmissions with a bit rate as high as 100Gbit/s. 
However, for the illegal attacks, the Q-factors of the recovery 
messages always keep at a very low level, even when the bit rate of 
message is low. The significant difference between the legal 
decryption and the illegal attacks can be more directly observed by 
comparing the eye diagrams of the messages recovered by the 
legal decryption and the illegal attacks shown in Figs. 5(b1)-5(c4). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed scheme supports 
high-speed secure optical communications. 
In the proposed scheme, due to the symmetric configurations, 
the CSPE (CSPD) module can work as the CSPD (CSPE) module for 
the opposite direction communication. Simultaneously, since the 
dispersive components and PMs in the CSPE and CSPD modules 
can work in a wide range of wavelength, the proposed scheme can 
also support WDM transmissions. Based on these properties, high-
speed secure bidirectional WDM communications is achievable. 
Here we take one bidirectional WDM transmission case with 7 
wavelengths centralized at 1550 nm and a typical channel spacing 
of 0.8 nm for instance. Figure 6 shows the Q-factors of decrypted 
messages versus the bit rate of message, under the bidirectional 
WDM communication scenario. It is shown that in both directions 
the communication performances show similar developing trends. 
For the central wavelength channel (Ch.0) and its two nearby 
channels (Ch.+1 and Ch.-1), when the bit rate of message is lower 
than 70 Gbit/s, satisfactory communication performance with Q-
 
Fig. 3.  Temporal waveforms of the chaotic signals generated by (a) 
DSL, (b) SLA and (c) SLB, as well as the cross-correlations of (d) 
SLA-SLB and (e) DSL-SLA. Since the cross-correlation of DSL-SLB is 
similar to that of DSL-SLA, it is not shown here for simplicity. 
 
Fig. 4.  Illustrations of the message recovery under the scenarios of 
legal CSPD (first row), direct detection attack (second row), illegal 
CSPD with injection chaos (third row), and illegal CSPD with chaos 
generated by solitary laser subject to chaos injection as SLA (SLB), 
for the 10Gbit/s and 40Gbit/s transmission scenarios. 
factors greater than 6 can be maintained. With respect to the single 
channel transmission scenario shown in Fig. 5, the communication 
performances on these three channels is slightly degraded when 
the message bit rate is relatively high (higher than about 60 Gbit/s), 
for the channel interferences. While for the far-from-central-
wavelength channels, namely the Ch.+2, Ch.-2, Ch.+3 and Ch.-3, the 
Q-factor performances are degraded, comparing with that of Ch.0. 
The transmission capacities (bit rate range in which the Q-factor is 
greater than 6) of these channels are also degraded to 60 Gbit/s, 
60 Gbit/s, 10Gbit/s and 10 Gbit/s, respectively. The performance 
degradation on the far-from-central-wavelength channels is 
attributed to that the dispersion considered into -D2 is evaluated 
by the transmission dispersion on central wavelength channel. For 
the channels nearby central wavelength channel, the transmission 
dispersions on these channels are similar to that of the central 
wavelength channel, thus the performances on these channels are 
similar to that of central wavelength channel. While for the far-
from-central-wavelength channels, the dispersion considered into 
-D2 is not so accurate as the transmission dispersions, as such the 
transmission dispersions on these channels cannot be totally 
compensated. Consequently, the decryption performances on 
these channels are degraded by the residual transmission 
dispersion-induced distortions. Although the CPSD cannot support 
a large number of WDM channels, secure bidirectional WDM 
transmission with a capacity of hundreds of Gbit/s in each 
direction is achievable, by utilizing the nearby-central-wavelength 
channels. In fact, when the number of WDM channels is large, the 
proposed technique can also be feasible, by dividing the WDM 
channels into different groups and in each group a pair of CSPE 
and CSPD working at the central wavelength of the corresponding 
group is used to achieve high-speed secure optical communication. 
In conclusion, we proposed a secure optical communication 
scheme that supports high-speed bidirectional WDM transmission, 
by introducing a pair of CSPE and CSPD modules that use privately 
synchronized chaotic signals as the secret key for encryption and 
decryption into conventional optical communication system. It is 
numerically demonstrated that with the CSPE, the original 
message can be encrypted as a noise-like signal, and the intrinsic 
timing clock of message can be efficiently hidden. In virtue of the 
private synchronous CSPE and CSPD, only the legal receiver can 
efficiently decrypt the message, while the eavesdroppers cannot. 
Moreover, the proposed scheme not only supports secure high-
speed transmission up to 100 Gbit/s on single channel, but also 
allows for simultaneous bidirectional secure WDM transmissions 
with capacity as large as hundreds of Gbit/s. The proposed 
physical secure communication scheme shows several salient 
features including inherent transparency to modulation formats, 
bidirectional WDM transmission suitability, plug-and-play in 
conventional optical communication systems and use of existing 
dispersion compensation modules.  
Funding.  National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) 
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